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I. INTRODUCTION
December 2000 has already been marked as the most significant
month in the 2000 Term of the United States Supreme Court. Someday,
historians may even designate this month as one of the most important
months in the history of the Court, for on December 11, the Court issued
its opinion in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph.1
Admittedly, the historians might be thinking of the Court's decision in
Bush v. Gore,2 which was delivered the very next day. Even though
Green Tree is less historically significant-and less controversial-it is
nonetheless an important development in evaluating the validity of
arbitration agreements.
Green Tree has two significant holdings. First, the term "final
decision," as it is used in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),3 carries its
well-established meaning of a decision that ends the litigation on the
merits and leaves nothing else for the court to do but execute the order.
4
Related to this issue, the Court clarified the application of this definition,
holding that there is no distinction between independent and embedded
actions.5 Second, an arbitration agreement that is silent regarding the
costs and fees of arbitration is enforceable when the record does not
support the litigant's perceived risk that prohibitive costs will prevent the
vindication of statutory rights.
6
II. FACTS, PROCEDURAL HISTORY, AND SUMMARY OF DECISIONS
In January 1994, Larketta Randolph purchased a mobile home from
the Better Cents Home Builders, Inc. of Opelika, Alabama.7 To finance
her purchase, Randolph turned to Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama
(Green Tree), a wholly owned subsidiary of the Green Tree Financial
* 121 S. Ct. 513 (2000).
Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 121 S. Ct. 513 (2000).
2 Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000). Indeed, the Green Tree decision was
issued right in the middle of the Bush v. Gore dispute.
3 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
4 Green Tree, 121 S. Ct. at 519-21.
5 Id. at 521.
6 Id. at 521-23.
7 Id. at 517; Petitioners' Brief at 517.
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Corporation.8 To obtain the financing, Randolph signed a "Manufactured
Home Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement."9 For the
purposes of this dispute, there were only two relevant terms. First,
Randolph was required to purchase "Vendor's Single Interest Insurance"
in order to protect the vendor, presumably Better Cents Home Builders, or
the lienholder in the event of Randolph's default.10 The insurance
specifically covered the costs of repossession.1' The second relevant term
was the agreement to submit all disputes related to the contract to binding
arbitration.
12
Contrary to what one might expect, this dispute did not begin with a
collection action against Randolph, with the enforceability of the
arbitration clause being her only recourse from the arbitrator's decision.
Rather, Randolph sued Green Tree, alleging that the company violated the
Truth in Lending Act (TLA),13 by failing to disclose the Vendor's Single
Interest insurance policy as a finance charge, as was required by the Truth
in Lending Act (TILA). 14 One may speculate that, upon her discovery of
8 Id. at 517.
9 Id. at 517-18.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 518 n.l. The arbitration agreement stated, in part,
All disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or relating to this
Contract or the relationships which result from this Contract, or the validity of
this arbitration clause or the entire contract, shall be resolved by binding
arbitration by one arbitrator selected by Assignee with consent of Buyer(s). This
arbitration Contract is made pursuant to a transaction in interstate commerce,
and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act at 9 U.S.C. Section 1.
Judgment upon the award rendered may be entered in any court having
jurisdiction. The parties agree and understand that they choose arbitration
instead of litigation to resolve disputes. The parties understand that they have a
right or opportunity to litigate disputes through court, but that they prefer to
resolve their disputes through arbitration except as provided herein. THE
PARTIES VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY WAIVE ANY RIGHT
THEY HAVE TO A JURY TRIAL EITHER PURSUANT TO ARBITRATION
UNDER THIS CLAUSE OR PURSUANT TO A COURT ACTION BY
ASSIGNEE (AS PROVIDED HEREIN): The parties agree and understand that
all disputes arising under case law, statutory law, and all other laws, including,
but not limited to, all contract, tort, and property disputes will be subject to
binding arbitration in accord with this Contract. The parties agree and
understand that the arbitrator shall have all powers provided by the law and the
Contract.
Id. (citation omitted).
13 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
14 Id. at 518.
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the arbitration clause, Randolph amended her complaint, alleging
violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 15 due to the contract's
requirement that she arbitrate her statutory claims. 16 In addition,
Randolph brought these claims as a class action.
17
Not surprisingly, Green Tree opted not to answer Randolph's claims,
filing instead "a motion to compel arbitration, to stay the action, or, in the
alternative, to dismiss." 18 In bringing multiple claims at one time, Green
Tree created an "embedded" proceeding.19 The District Court, ruling on
four motions, (1) refused to certify Randolph's class action, (2) granted
Green Tree's motion to compel arbitration, (3) denied Green Tree's
motion to stay, and (4) dismissed Randolph's claims with prejudice.
20
After a failed attempt at a motion for reconsideration, Randolph appealed
to the Eleventh Circuit.21 Thus, all of the District Court's holdings were in
favor of Green Tree and arbitration.
The Eleventh Circuit then decided two issues: whether the District
Court's ruling was an appealable final decision, and whether the
arbitration agreement provided enough minimum guarantees so that
Randolph could properly pursue her TILA cause of action.22 On the first
question, the Eleventh Circuit decided that a final decision under the
FAA23 is an order that disposes of all issues and leaves nothing to be done
other than execution of the order.24 Therefore, Randolph's appeal was
proper.
The Eleventh Circuit's second holding was decidedly more
controversial. Noting that the arbitration agreement was silent as to the
payment of costs of arbitration, the court found that the agreement "posed
a risk" that Randolph would be unable to "vindicate her statutory rights"
,because of the high costs of arbitration.25 Thus, the arbitration agreement
was held to be unenforceable. 26 This victory for the plaintiffs was,
15 Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1994).
16 Green Tree, 121 S. Ct. at 518.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 520.




23 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 16 (2000).
24 Green Tree, 121 S. Ct. at 518.
25 Id.
26 Id.
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however, short-lived. After granting certiorari, the United States Supreme
Court agreed that the District Court's order was a final, appealable
decision.27 But the Court strengthened its decision in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation,28 holding that an arbitration
agreement is not unenforceable merely because it is silent with respect to
payment of the costs of arbitration.29
III. DISCUSSION
A. The District Court's Order is a Final, Appealable Decision
Under the FAA
The first question addressed by the court was whether the District
Court's order was immediately appealable. 30 Following the same logic as
the Eleventh Circuit, the Court began by examining Section 16 of the
FAA.31 In relevant part, section 16 states,
(a) An appeal may be taken from-.. .. (3) a final decision with
respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title. (b) Except as
otherwise provided in section 1292(b) of title 28, an appeal may not be
taken from an interlocutory order-(1) granting a stay of any action
under section 3 of this title; (2) directing arbitration to proceed under
section 4 of this title; (3) compelling arbitration under section 206 of
this title; or (4) refusing to enjoin an arbitration that is subject to this
title.32
The District Court's order did, in fact, compel arbitration and dismiss
all other claims. 33 Whether such an order was a "final decision with
respect to an arbitration," per section 16(a)(3), was not as easy of a
question. Green Tree presented the Court with a rather elaborate argument
that explained why the District Court's order is not immediately
appealable. First, Green Tree contended that the drafters of section 16
meant only to provide immediate appeal of an interlocutory order when
2 7 1d. at 518-19.
28 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
29 Green Tree, 121 S. Ct. at 522.
30 Id. at 519.
31 See id. See 9 U.S.C. § 16 (1996) for the Federal Arbitration Act.
32 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 16 (2000).
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that order is "hostile to arbitration. '34 Since the District Court's order
favored arbitration, Green Tree argued that section 16 did not permit an
appeal.35 Rejecting this argument, the Court stated that section 16(a)(3)
permits an immediate appeal of any such final decision, "regardless of
whether the decision is favorable or -hostile to arbitration." 36 Then,
pointing to Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc.37 and
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,38 the Court held that the longstanding
meaning of the term "final decision" that has developed over time is "a
decision that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for
the court to do but execute the judgment."'39 The Court then held that,
because the FAA neither defines "final decision" nor indicates otherwise,
this meaning applies today.
40
Because the District Court's order compelled arbitration and
dismissed all of Randolph's other claims with prejudice,41 the court was
left with nothing more to do but execute the judgment.42 This, of course,
meets the definition of a final decision. If the District Court had instead
entered a stay, then Randolph would not have been allowed to appeal.
43
The Supreme Court noted that "[t]he question whether the District Court
should have taken that course [and entered a stay] is not before us, and we
do not address it."'44 Nonetheless, Green Tree contended in oral arguments
that because the District Court should have entered a stay, the Supreme
Court should simply treat the District Court's actual order as a stay, which
would thus be unappealable.45 Having already rejected this argument
orally, the Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's decision that the District
Court's order in this case was a final decision under the FAA, and thus
immediately appealable.
46
34 Green Tree, 121 S. Ct. at 519.
35 Id.
3 6 1d.
37 Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994).
38 Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
39 Green Tree, 121 S. Ct. at 519 (citations omitted).
40 Id. at 519.
41 Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1410, 1425 (M.D. Ala.
1997).
42 Green Tree, 121 S. Ct. at 519-20.
43 Id. at 520 n.2.
44Id.
45 Oral Argument of Petitioner at 3-15, Gree Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v.
Randolph, 121 S. Ct. 513 (2000) (No. 99-1235), available at 2000 WL 1513141.
46 Green Tree, 121 S. Ct. at 521.
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B. Silence on Costs of Arbitration, by Itself, Does Not Render an
Arbitration Agreement Unenforceable
The Court also held that Randolph could not simply point to the
arbitration agreement's silence regarding the payment of the costs of
arbitration and claim that the agreement is therefore unenforceable. The
potential risk that the costs of arbitration may be prohibitive is not enough
to show that the agreement's silence on the costs will prevent Randolph
from vindicating her statutory rights. 47
In reaching this conclusion, the Court first paid tribute to Gilmer,
which stated that the FAA's purpose was "to reverse the longstanding
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements... and to place arbitration
agreements upon the same footing as other contracts." 48 The Court's
analysis began by noting that Randolph (1) had not disputed that she
agreed to arbitrate, and (2) did not attempt to show that Congress intended
to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies. 49 Of course, the Court was
alluding to the intriguing fact that, although Randolph did not want to
arbitrate her claims, she did not attempt to avoid arbitration per Gilmer.
50
Instead, Randolph submitted that, because the arbitration agreement is
silent regarding costs and fees, she bore a "risk" of having to pay
prohibitive costs. 51 Thus, Randolph argued that this risk prevented her
from vindicating her statutory rights in arbitration.
52
The Court then found that, in the absence of any evidence on the
record showing that Randolph's perceived risk would ever come to
fruition, the risk of her having to pay a prohibitive sum of money is "too
speculative to justify the invalidation of [the] arbitration agreement.
53
The "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements" would be
47 Id.




50 Id. (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24).
51 Id.
52 Id. Note, however, that the Court in Gilmer established the standard that a
federal statutory claim may be subject to arbitration when the parties have bargained
for an arbitration agreement and Congress has not indicated "an intention to preclude
a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue." Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
53 Green Tree, 121 S. Ct. at 522. The Court further indicated that Green Tree's
counsel stated in oral arguments that the petitioners often voluntarily pay all
arbitration costs. Id. at 522 n. 6.
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frustrated if the Court enforces the agreement when the record is as
devoid of support as it is in this case.
54
Indeed, Randolph had the burden of showing that the agreement was
invalid, either under Gilmer or due to its prohibitive costs.55 In this
respect, Randolph completely failed.56 Thus, the agreement's silence with
respect to costs does not negate its validity.
57
IV. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ON REMAND
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer
joined, concluded her separate concurring opinion with the following
advice to the Eleventh Circuit:
The class-action issue was properly raised in the District Court and
the Court of Appeals. I do not read the Court's opinion to preclude
resolution of that question now by the Eleventh Circuit. Nothing
Randolph has so far done in seeking protection against prohibitive costs
forfeits her right to a judicial determination whether her claim may
proceed either in court or arbitration as a class action.58
In accordance with this advice, the Eleventh Circuit's decision on
remand primarily discussed "whether an arbitration agreement that bars
pursuit of classwide relief for TILA violations is unenforceable . .. .59
Gihner, of course, provides the appropriate guidance for determining
whether a federal statutory claim is arbitrable. 60  Because the
Congressional intent in effecting the FAA must always be considered
alongside Congress's intent for enforcing any other statute, Gilmer holds,
statutory claims are always arbitrable unless Congress "evince[s] an
intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights
at issue." 61 Randolph, as the party seeking to avoid arbitration, had the
burden of showing this intent.62 In addition, Gilmer stated that an inherent
54 Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 24 (1983)). The Court noted that Randolph had yet to offer any evidence




58 Id. at 525 n.4 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
59 Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 244 F.3d 814, 816 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
60 Id. (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)).
61 Id. at 817 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26).
62 Id. (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26).
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conflict between the policies underlying the statute at issue and the
enforcement of the statute is not enough to meet this burden. 63
In concluding that Randolph failed to show that the absence of class
relief in the arbitral forum makes the agreement unenforceable under
Gilmer, the Court pointed to its recent analysis in Bowen v. First Family
Financial Services, Inc.64 The Court in Bowen examined and analyzed
this issue under Gilmer and found that neither the text and its legislative
history, nor the inherent conflict between TILA and the FAA renders an
arbitration agreement unenforceable. 65 Bowen concluded that TILA
allowed class actions but did not provide an absolute, non-waivable right
to class relief.66 However, this analysis was dicta in Bowen because the
plaintiff did not have standing to have such a claim adjudicated. 67
Succinctly put, in its opinion on remand the Eleventh Circuit applied
its analysis from Bowen and held that Randolph failed to meet the burden
established in Gilmer, as described above.68 Thus, an enforceable
arbitration agreement may preclude a party from seeking class relief
under TILA.69 As the lower court then pointed out, this decision reflects
the opinion of the Third Circuit in Johnson v. West Suburban Bank,70
which held that TLA claims are arbitrable even if the arbitration
agreement expressly prohibits class relief.71 The Eleventh Circuit was
confident that the Supreme Court would approve of its opinion on remand
because it was consistent with Gilmer (and Green Tree) in that the lower
court gave full weight to the policy of the FAA.72
The Eleventh Circuit also briefly entertained Randolph's claim that
the arbitration agreement's silence on the issue of class actions should not
prevent her from seeking classwide relief in arbitration.73 Randolph
argued that allowing such relief would properly reconcile any discord
between the FAA's goals and TLA's enforcement scheme.74 After
63 Id. (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27-28).
64 Id. at 817-18 (citing Bowen v. First Family Fin. Servs. Inc., 233 F.3d 1331
(11 th Cir. 2000)).
65 Id. (citing Bowen, 233 F.3d at 1334, 1338).
66 Id. at 817 (citing Bowen, 233 F.3d at 1337-38).
6 7 Id. at 818 n.1.
6 8 1d. at 817-18.
69 Id. at 819.
70 Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369 (3d Cir. 2000).
71 Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 244 F.3d 814, 818 (11th Cir. 2001).
72 Id. at 818-19.
73 Id. at 815-16.
74 Id. at 815.
236
[Vol. 17:1 20011
GREEN TREE FINANCIAL CORP.-ALABAMA
signifying that its decision in Protective Life Insurance Corp. v. Lincoln
National Life Insurance Corp.75 may require it to join the reasoning of the
Seventh Circuit and the District Court of Minnesota, which held in
Champ v. Siegel Trading Co.7 6 and Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer
Discount Co.,77 respectively, that courts cannot mandate class-wide
arbitration when the arbitration agreement is silent on this matter, the
court declined to decide the issue because the argument was not properly
preserved by the appellant.78 The District Court originally held that
Protective Life barred the pursuit of classwide relief in arbitration.79 Thus,
the Eleventh Circuit speculated, Randolph strategically rested on the
District Court's holding in formulating her subsequent arguments.80 As




Although Larketta Randolph almost certainly did not anticipate being
required to appear before the United States Supreme Court when she
questioned the propriety of a relatively insignificant fee, many in the
dispute resolution community are thankful for the clarity provided by the
resulting decision, albeit on two narrow issues.82 However, Green Tree
may also prove useful due to its foreshadowing of arbitration-related
issues that the Court may resolve in the near- future, such as whether a
"loser pays" arbitration system is -too cost prohibitive,, or whether a
Motion to Compel may be changed to a Motion to Stay. While arbitration
has existed in the United States for much. of our litigious history, this case
shows how much potential there is for improvement in the law governing
the enforcement of arbitration agreements. Given the Court's strong
75 Protective Life Ins. Corp. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Corp., 873 F.2d 281 (1 1th
Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
76 Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F. 3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995).
77 Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Disc. Co., 828 F. Supp. 673 (D. Minn. 1993).
78 Randolph, 244 F.3d at 815-16.
79 Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1410, 1424 (M.D. Ala.
1997).
80 Randolph, 244 F.3d at 816.
81 Id.
82 Marshall E. Tracht, Arbitration of Truth-In-Lending Act Claims, 118
BANKING L.J. 3, 4 (2001).
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affirmation of the landmark Gilmer case, one can only expect that the
Court will continue to proactively support arbitration as an effective
method of resolving disputes of all degrees of complexity for the
foreseeable future.
Aaron M. McClain
